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CLASS ACTIONS AND RULE 10b-5: A CRITIQUE 
OF NEWTON V. MERRILL LYNCH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally presumed that when one hires an agent for a particular 
task, that agent will use reasonable efforts to carry out the task in a manner 
that maximizes the benefit to the principal.1 This presumption becomes 
particularly important in situations in which the principal does not have 
the specialized knowledge necessary to carry out the task. In few places is 
this as clear as in the investment industry, an industry that, by its nature, 
requires that the principal has the ability to police the agent in order to be 
certain that the agent satisfies this standard. Absent the power to police 
agents, principals are vulnerable, and agents have less incentive to carry 
out tasks properly. In the investment context, this policing power is 
distributed to both governmental agencies and private actors.2 However, 
the rapid development of technology combined with the industry’s 
complexity makes policing agents very difficult.  To date, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has done a 
commendable job adapting to technological change.3 Yet from the 
 1. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 424 (1958). “[A]n agent employed to buy or to sell is 
subject to the principal . . . to be loyal to the principal’s interests and to use reasonable care to obtain 
terms which best satisfy the manifested purpose of the principal.” Id. (quoted in Ferrell, infra note 18). 
 2. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 3. The SEC and Congress have responded to changes in technology in a variety of ways 
throughout history. For instance, they created the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System 
(“NASDAQ”) in order to exploit innovation. In re Merrill Lynch; Securities Litig., 911 F. Supp. 754, 
758 (D.N.J. 1995) (“Merrill Lynch I”). More recently, the Small Order Exchange System (“SOES”) 
and NAqcess provide examples of the SEC’s willingness to accommodate technological change. Id. at 
759-60. Furthermore, in addition to the creation of systems, the SEC has adapted to technological 
changes by requiring the use of the best technology available: 
The scope of this duty of best execution must evolve as changes occur in the market that give 
rise to improved executions for customer orders, including opportunities to trade at more 
advantageous prices. As these changes occur, broker-dealers’ procedures for seeking to obtain 
best execution for customer orders also must be modified to consider price opportunities that 
become “reasonably available”.  
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 271 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), 
cert. denied sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kravitz, 525 U.S. 811 (1998) 
(quoting Accord Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 
48290, 48322-23 (Sept. 12, 1996)) (“Newton I”). The duty of best execution has clearly evolved over 
time. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW, ¶ 10.10 (1996). For further discussion of the duty of best 
execution, see infra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of new proposals, see 
Report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information: Blueprint for Responsible Change 
(2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.html. See also Joel 
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principal’s perspective, it remains difficult to assure that an agent sought 
out the most favorable deal. When individuals suffer relatively small 
damages, class action suits become one important method of policing 
agents4 because they reduce the cost of the litigation for each individual 
and make it affordable to assert claims. 
In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,5 the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals shut the door on a potential class action, thereby 
impeding the individual class members’ ability to protect themselves. In 
Newton, thousands of plaintiffs sought certification for a class action 
against three broker-dealer firms.6 The plaintiffs claimed that the broker-
dealers did not disclose their failure to satisfy the duty of best execution,7 
and thus violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ’34 
Act”)8 and Rule 10b-59 promulgated thereunder. Essentially, the plaintiffs 
argued that the broker-dealers10 failed to disclose that they would not take 
advantage of readily available technology which offered potentially 
superior deals, and thus violated the ’34 Act.11 After battles in the district 
and appeals courts, the Third Circuit held that because the class could not 
prove an injury on a class-wide basis, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3)12 class certification was inappropriate.13  
Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information and 
the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW 637 (2002).  
 4. See Phillips Pertroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See also Brian Wolfman, 
Forward: National Association of Consumer Advocates’ Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and 
Settling Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 370 (1998); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). 
 5. The Newton case traveled up and down the Third Circuit over several years. The district 
court first ruled, granting summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that there was no proof of 
“reliance” on a “material misrepresentation,” elements necessary for a Rule 10b-5 claim. Merrill 
Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1995). The case then went to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Newton I, 135 F.3d 266. The Third Circuit overruled the district court and extended the presumption of 
reliance from Basic v. Levinson. See 485 U.S. 224 (1988). On remand, the district court again ruled 
against the plaintiffs. In re Merrill Lynch Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 391 (D.N.J. 1999) (“Merrill Lynch 
II”). This time, the district court refused to certify the proposed class. The case was again appealed to 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 259 F.3d 
154 (3d Cir. 2001), amended by Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 
(3d Cir. October 16, 2001) (“Newton II”). For clarity, this Note will refer to the district court decisions 
as “Merrill I” and “Merrill II” and the appellate decisions as “Newton I” and “Newton II,” and to the 
case as a whole as “Newton.” 
 6. The firms included Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Painewebber, Inc., and Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
 7. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 173. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). 
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). 
 10. A “broker-dealer” performs specific activities. See infra notes 89-90. 
 11. For an extensive discussion of plaintiffs’ claim, see Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 756-58. 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (1998) [hereinafter Rule 23(b)(3)]. 
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As the dust settles from the Third Circuit’s decision, it is unclear what 
effect the decision will have on the enforcement of the securities laws. 
This Note argues that the Newton decision serves to reduce private 
enforcement of Rule 10b-5 by constraining class actions. Although 
Newton recognizes that the defendants may have violated Rule 10b-5,14 it 
refuses to remove impediments to the proposed class and therefore 
significantly limits class actions as a means of private enforcement.15 
Therefore, this Note argues that the decision will affect principals’ ability 
to feel secure that their agents are obtaining the best terms for their 
trades.16 
This Note analyzes the decisions in Newton with an eye toward the 
evolution of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5. Because this is a recent 
decision,17 commentators have not had much time to digest it.18 But given 
the attention to the first Newton opinion, this decision is likely to receive a 
good deal of scrutiny. This Note anticipates some areas of discussion and 
concludes that the Third Circuit could have, and should have, certified the 
class for at least a portion of the litigation. 
Part II addresses the context and history of the Newton decisions and 
introduces the crucial concepts behind the plaintiffs’ theory. It first 
provides a brief overview of the securities markets in general, and the 
“over-the-counter” market in particular. Second, it discusses the applicable 
regulatory framework as well as the duty of best execution and the 
requisite elements of a prima facie 10b-5 case. Third, it describes the 
applicable certification requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Finally, it traces the history of Newton from the district court 
through the most recent Third Circuit decision.  
 13. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 181. 
 14. Newton I¸ 135 F.3d at 274. 
 15. 259 F.3d at 154. Because litigation is expensive and plaintiffs individually lost relatively 
small amounts, the pooling of costs via a class action represents the only cost-effective means of 
pressing these claims, unless a single individual lost a substantial amount. See infra note 29. 
 16. This does not negate the possibility of SEC enforcement, but the SEC has not involved itself 
in this case. Also, without class action, the utility of liability as a means to pressure the industry to use 
technology in fulfilling the duty of best execution is diminished. 
 17. The decision in Newton II was released on August 6, 2001 and amended on October 16, 
2001. For some early commentary on the decision, see Seligman, supra note 3, at 651-52; Denial of 
Class Certification Affirmed in Suit Against Brokers, 7 No. 2 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 3 
(2001). 
 18. The decision in Newton I received much attention. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 3, at 
¶ 10.10 [3]; Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the “Payment for Order Flow” Problem, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1027 (2001).  
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Part III discusses the decisions of the district court and the Third 
Circuit throughout the case. It notes some differences between the two 
appellate decisions as well as between the district court and the Third 
Circuit. The main focus, however, is on the Third Circuit’s rationale for 
affirming the denial of certification.  
Part IV critically analyzes the most recent Newton decision. It uncovers 
logical inconsistencies within Newton II and argues that the decision 
poorly reflects the spirit of the ’34 Act. 
Finally, Part V provides an alternative to the Third Circuit’s approach. 
It suggests that the class could have been certified under Rule 23(b)(3) for 
some, if not all, of the litigation. It concludes that, because class action is 
needed to facilitate private enforcement of the ’34 Act, certification should 
be granted in such cases. 
Parties enforcing the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 should not tolerate the 
activities alleged in Newton.19 Even though the analysis of the Third 
Circuit may be reasonable, the end result limits private enforcement. 
II. THE HISTORY OF NEWTON, § 10(b), RULE 10b-5, AND CERTIFICATION 
UNDER 23(b)(3) 
The securities industry is a complex web of markets. The plaintiffs in 
Newton were investors in a particular segment of the market: the “over-
the-counter” market (“OTC”).20 Plaintiffs engaged defendants as broker-
dealers to execute their trades under the assumption that the defendants 
would fulfill their obligations arising out of that agency relationship.21 
Plaintiffs contended that defendants failed to meet those obligations, 
specifically the duty of best execution, without proper disclosure, and 
therefore violated § 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5.22 The following 
briefly describes (1) the history of the Newton case,23 (2) the securities 
markets in general and the “over-the-counter” market in particular,24 (3) 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the elements of a prima facie case under those 
regulations,25 (4) the common law and regulatory obligations of the duty 
 19. The major harm arising out of the alleged activities is to the market’s integrity. If the claims 
are true, they should give investors pause because there is very little that can be done to supervise their 
agents. Given that integrity is arguably the market’s most valuable asset, the ’34 Act aims to protect it. 
See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 40-68 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text. 
 22. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 173. 
 23. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 40-68 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text. 
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of best execution,26 and (5) the requirements for class certification under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).27 
A. History of Newton 
The proposed class in Newton represented thousands of clients of three 
major broker-dealer firms who purchased or sold securities during the 
period from November 4, 1992 until November 4, 1996 (“the class 
period”).28 During this period, there were hundreds of millions of 
transactions involving billions of dollars affecting members of the class.29 
The class alleged that each of the broker-dealers accepted the clients’ 
orders with the intention of only executing those transactions on the 
NBBO30 and not even considering alternate services or methods of 
execution31 to determine if a superior deal could be obtained.32 Plaintiffs 
claimed that this was a violation of the broker-dealers’ duty of best 
execution,33 and therefore the failure to notify the client of their intentions 
prior to accepting the order amounted to a “material misrepresentation” in 
violation of Rule 10b-5.34  
Initially, the case was brought in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey and dismissed on summary judgment for lack of 
a “material misrepresentation” and “reliance.”35 On appeal, after an initial 
hearing and then a rehearing en banc, the Third Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs did state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5.36 The court found that 
there could have been a material misrepresentation and extended a 
“presumption of reliance” on that misstatement.37 On remand, the district 
court struck down the plaintiffs’ case again by refusing to certify the class 
on the grounds that it failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rules of 
 26. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text. 
 28. 191 F.R.D. at 393. 
 29. 259 F.3d at 187. Although the sheer dollar amount is astonishing, the transactions were 
spread out over a large class. In addition, the difference between the prices offered by the alternative 
systems was small. Thus, the actual loss per client was relatively small. A study conducted for the 
district court revealed that the largest damage amount associated with for any one trade was twenty-
five dollars. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 764-67. 
 30. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text. 
 31. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text. 
 32. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 757-58. 
 33. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. 
 34. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 757-58. 
 35. Id. at 754. 
 36. Newton I, 135 F.3d 274. 
 37. Id. 
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Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).38 Plaintiffs again appealed to the Third 
Circuit. This time, a panel of the Third Circuit, while disagreeing with 
some of the district court’s analysis, upheld the denial of certification 
based on its finding that the proposed class failed to meet the requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).39 
B. The Securities Markets and the “Over-the-Counter” Market 
The securities markets are a complex array of institutions that involve 
numerous types of instruments and trading systems.40 The diversity of 
players and instruments in the securities industry make it both the 
backbone of the U.S. economy41 and the focal point of a complex regime 
of interconnected systems and regulations.42 These regulations include 
both common law rules of agency as well as institutionally imposed 
restrictions on behavior.43 
Newton involved a specific segment of the securities market: the “over-
the-counter” market (“OTC”). Major marketplaces, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”), 
provide a “floor” for negotiations and transactions of securities.44 In the 
OTC, negotiations and transactions occur outside of the traditional “floor” 
setting.45 The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) 
 38. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. 391. 
 39. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 40. For a general discussion of the markets, see POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION § 1.01 (3d ed. 1999). 
 41. POSER, supra 40, at § 1.01, at 1-5 (listing the relative dollar values of different components 
of the securities industry) (citing Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings Fourth Quarter 1998 at 69-81 (Sept. 15, 
2000). But Poser also notes: 
because of the central role played by brokers and dealers in raising capital, directing the 
savings of millions of individual investors, facilitating mergers and acquisitions, and making 
secondary markets in securities, the relative amount of financial assets that they hold gives an 
inadequate picture of the importance of these firms in the economy. Broker-dealer firms 
played a key role in the dynamic stock market of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which has 
enabled the U.S. economy “to reallocate resources on a large scale from traditional industries 
to new high-growth sectors linked to [information technology] and the Internet.” 
Id. (citing David Hale, Rebuilt by Wall Street, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000). 
 42. POSER, supra note 40 § 1.01, at 1-4–1-5. This complex system of regulations requirements 
that broker-dealers register with the SEC under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, become members of 
the NASD (although some broker-dealers do not have to be NASD members), register with one of the 
stock exchanges, which in turn, has its own set of rules and regulations, and follow the rules and 
regulations imposed by the applicable state commissions (the so-called “Blue Sky” laws). Id. 
 43. Id. See also supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
 44. On the “floor,” individual negotiators, or “specialists,” meet to negotiate and transact 
securities deals face-to-face. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 268. 
 45. Unlike the NYSE or AMEX, the OTC has no “floor.” Rather, the OTC “is, in a sense, the 
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governs the activities of the OTC and is itself subject to the oversight of 
the SEC.46 In 1971, Congress created the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (“NASDAQ”),47 a 
subsidiary of the NASD. NASDAQ is Congress’s attempt to respond to 
technological change and harness it to enhance the efficiency of securities 
transactions.48 NASDAQ links OTC dealers across the country via a 
computer system.49 All participants in the NASDAQ are required to list 
their current “bid” and “ask” prices50 on the National Best Bid Best Offer 
(“NBBO”) system.51 The NBBO, in turn, processes the information 
provided by the broker-dealers across the country and lists the best bid and 
ask prices.52 Thus, when a broker-dealer wishes to execute a trade, she 
looks to the NBBO to find the best prices submitted by all of the other 
broker-dealers in the country. This system greatly enhances both the 
efficiency of the market as well as the diversity of the participants by 
creating immediate nation-wide access to the system.53 
oldest and simplest type of economic exchange: buyer and seller meet outside a formal marketplace, 
agree on a price and exchange items of economic value.” Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 758 (citing 
Reshaping The Equity Markets, Robert A. Schwartz at 47 (HarperBusiness 1991)).  
 46. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 268. 
 47. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 758 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(A) and (D) 
(2000)). 
 48. Id. The Court noted that Congress made the purpose of NASDAQ explicit: 
The securities markets are an important national asset which must be preserved and 
strengthened . . . . The linking of all markets for qualified securities through communication 
and data processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the 
information available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors’ 
orders, and contribute to best execution of such orders. 
Id. 
 49. Thus, broker-dealers in Cincinnati or Philadelphia can quickly and easily execute electronic 
trades with broker-dealers in Boston or Chicago without the need for a “floor” or face-to-face 
interaction. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 758. See also POSER, supra note 40. 
 50. A “bid” price is the price at which a security may be purchased (i.e., the price at which 
another market-maker is willing to sell their security). The “ask” price is the price at which a security 
can be sold (i.e., the price at which another market-maker is willing to buy the security). The 
difference between the “bid” and the “ask” prices is the “spread.” Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 758-
59. “In order to ‘foster the risk-taking function of market makers and thereby . . . provide free market 
incentives to active participation in the flow of orders . . .’” market makers are allowed to capture the 
spread as their profit. Id. at 758 (citing Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Report of the Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (1975); Plastis v. 
E.F. Hutton, No. G86-1030CA5, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4828 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Investors Research 
Corp., 1976 SEC LEXIS 2771 (1976)). 
 51. Id. at 759 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-1(c)(1) (2000)). 
 52. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-1(a)(10), 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-1(c)(2) (2000)). 
 53. Rather than funneling all trades to the floor, where face-to-face negotiations occur, the 
NBBO gives the broker-dealer instantaneous access to the best bid and best ask prices currently listed. 
No negotiations are necessary. Rather, with the click of one, or perhaps two, buttons the order is 
immediately executed. 
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Today, however, changes in technology have facilitated alternatives to 
the NBBO, and therefore the prices listed on the NBBO may not always 
be the best prices available to the broker-dealer.54 Beginning in November 
of 1990, SelectNet offered an alternative to the NBBO.55 In addition to 
SelectNet, Institutional Networks, Inc. (“Instinet”) provides another list of 
prices that can differ from the NBBO.56 There are distinctions between the 
NBBO, SelectNet, and Instinet that might make a particular system more 
or less attractive to a broker-dealer.57 For purposes of this Note, the 
distinctions are themselves largely irrelevant, but that they exist is not.58 
Rather, there are two critical aspects of the three systems that relate to the 
Newton case. First, the listings offered by SelectNet and Instinet can be 
different from the NBBO and therefore they might be superior or inferior 
to the NBBO.59 Indeed, Newton I cites one study indicating that 
 54. Plaintiffs contended that defendants ignored internet sources such as Instinet and SelectNet, 
as well as several other avenues by which trades could have been executed at superior prices. Merrill I, 
911 F. Supp. at 757-58. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that defendants participated in “payment for 
order flow” schemes in which the brokers to whom the plaintiffs’ trades were given did not achieve the 
best execution for the trade. Id. at 758. 
 55. The district court described SelectNet as follows:  
SelectNet is an on-line service provided by NASDAQ on which subscribers can negotiate 
trades and execute orders in OTC securities. In addition to price, offers posted by subscribers 
can specify size, the period during which the offer is “open,” (any period up to 99 minutes or 
an entire day), and whether the price or size of an order is negotiable. Subscribers may also 
“preference” their orders, that is, an order may be directed at a specific market maker, at all 
market makers, or at all subscribers. Offers may be accepted, countered or declined. 
Subscribers who are not market makers may make their offers anonymously. Market makers 
must identify themselves. 
The thrust of the SelectNet service is to provide an electronic alternative to negotiation by 
telephone. “The system is offered to NASD members to facilitate negotiation of securities 
transactions through computer automation, rather than relying on telephone communication.”  
Id. at 759 (quoting Market 2000, An Examination of Current Equity Market Developments, Division 
of Market Regulation of the SEC, Section IV at 6-7, 1994 SEC LEXIS 135 (1994)). 
 56. The district court described Instinet as: 
another on-line trading system, similar to SelectNet but differing in two important aspects: 1) 
it is privately owned and operated; and 2) subscribers, including market makers, may display 
offers and trade anonymously. Traders, particularly large institutions, may therefore conduct 
large transactions without any revelation of their identity that might induce market reaction 
against their interest. Orders are accepted from a minimum of 1000 shares to a maximum of 
50,000 shares. Although it conducts trades on behalf of clients, Instinet is not a market maker 
and therefore does not risk its own capital, charging only a commission for its services. 
Id. (citing Instinet Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 672345) (emphasis in original).  
 57. For instance, differences in identification requirements, the time limits or size restrictions, 
might have an effect on the decision to use the NBBO, SelectNet, or Instinet.  
 58. This is for a couple of reasons. First, the courts assume that all investors are interested only in 
economic gain. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 271. Second, if the economic considerations are important, then 
the defendants’ policy of uniform methods of execution makes no sense, regardless of what the 
differences may be. 
 59. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 759-60. 
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approximately eighty-five percent of the bids displayed on Instinet and 
ninety percent of the bids on SelectNet were superior to the publicly 
posted NASDAQ prices.60 Second, because they are internet-based, 
broker-dealers have easy access to the systems.61 These two components 
of the NBBO alternatives became the crux of the dispute in Newton.62  
In addition to Instinet and SelectNet, plaintiffs alleged that there were 
numerous other methods by which the defendants could have executed 
their trades.63 Plaintiffs contended that defendants could have simply 
“crossed” offers to buy and sell within their own institution to achieve a 
price “between the quotes.”64 They also argued that the firms could have 
used the Small Order Execution System (“SOES”)65 whereby smaller 
transactions could occur at the NBBO prices when it might otherwise have 
been difficult to execute such trades at the NBBO price levels.66 In all, 
plaintiffs claimed that there were at least four methods readily available to 
 60. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 272. 
 61. To access these systems, one only needs an online computer and perhaps an account with the 
system. There should be little question that these firms either had or could easily obtain access. Indeed, 
plaintiffs even claimed that “defendants regularly used these services and knew that prices better than 
NBBO were often available through them.” Newton I, 135 F.3d at 269. Plaintiffs even accused 
defendants of re-trading on those systems for their own profit. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 758. 
 62. The price differential offers the basis for the argument that the broker-dealers’ systematic 
failure to look at the non-NBBO services violated the duty of best execution. Simply put, the plaintiffs 
claimed that because there are easily accessible alternatives to the NBBO that could conceivably offer 
superior prices, the failure to utilize or even consider those systems as a potential source of liquidity 
constituted a failure to meet the duty of best execution. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 269. 
 63. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 757-58. 
 64. Id. at 760. The district court described “crossing” as follows: 
Individual integrated firms, functioning as either agents or principals, receive orders to both 
buy and sell securities in the course of the trading day. When either a limit or market order is 
received before a “corresponding” order is executed, the possibility exists that the two orders 
could be matched, or “crossed” at a price midway between them. “Call market” trading 
systems employed in some foreign countries, e.g., Austria, Belgium, Germany and Israel, as 
opposed to “continuous” trading systems employed on the United States financial markets 
(both securities exchanges and the OTC markets), regularly utilize this type of order crossing 
by periodically batching corresponding offers for simultaneous execution at a single 
“clearing” price . . . . 
Id. at 760. 
 65. The district court described the SOES in Merrill Lynch I as: 
In response to the general sentiment that retail customers were not obtaining execution at the 
best possible price, the SEC created [the SOES] in December, 1984. Participation in SOES 
was made mandatory for market makers after the October 1987 crash . . . . Automatic 
execution on SOES provides small customers with the opportunity to consistently obtain the 
NBBO by automatically routing orders to the market maker with the best posted bid or offer. 
Merrill Lynch I at 759-60. The opinion goes on to describe the 1989 introduction of the Limit-Order 
Service as an extension of the SOES. Id. at 760. 
 66. Merrill Lynch I¸ 911 F. Supp. at 757. 
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the defendants to obtain prices superior to the NBBO.67 The crucial 
assertion was that the alternatives (1) offered a potentially better price and 
(2) were easily available. Because of the failure to even consider these 
alternatives, or as plaintiffs alleged, re-trading on those alternate services 
for their own profit, plaintiffs claimed that the broker-dealers did not 
obtain trades on the terms most favorable to their clients.68 
C. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
During the 1930s, in the wake of the stock market crash and in the 
midst of the Great Depression, Congress drastically altered the federal 
government’s involvement in the securities industry.69 Popular sentiment 
shifted from the support for unregulated markets to an increased demand 
for government oversight.70 
As part of the ’34 Act, § 10(b) aimed to protect the integrity of the 
securities markets. The stock market crash demonstrated the importance of 
investor confidence and Congress recognized the need to protect the 
integrity of the markets in order to make them function properly.71 In part, 
Congress chose § 10(b) to achieve precisely that end.72 
Under the authority granted to the SEC by § 10(b), the SEC adopted 
Rule 10b-5.73 The SEC, in response to a particular instance of fraud that 
 67. Id. at 758. In arguably the most serious of the allegations, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants “re-traded” securities on the same side of the spread (in other words, purchased or sold a 
security at the NBBO when a better price was available and then performed the same transaction again 
at the superior price) in order to capture the additional profit for themselves. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. 
Supp. at 758. 
 68. Id. at 757-58. 
 69. In a series of Congressional and Executive actions, the federal government changed its 
traditional policy and began to vigorously regulate economic activity. The Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are two such examples. 
 70. For a detailed history of the ’34 Act, see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). See also, John H. Walsh, A Simple 
Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities 
Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001).  
 71. Id. 
 72. § 10(b) states, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful: 
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission 
may prescribe. 
Newton I, 259 F.3d at 173 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1934)). 
 73. Rule 10b-5 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
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did not appear to be covered by the then-existing regulations, drafted and 
passed the broad-sweeping Rule 10b-5 with virtually no discussion.74 
The ’34 Act in general, and Rule 10b-5 in particular, provide a cause of 
action for fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”75 
The Third Circuit restated the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim in Newton I, 
holding that in order to state a claim under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate a material misrepresentation or omission, made with scienter, 
that is relied upon by the plaintiffs to their detriment.76 Yet Newton II 
made clear that “[a] broker-dealer who ‘accepts such an order while 
intending to breach [the duty of best execution] makes a misrepresentation 
that is material to the purchase or sale of a security . . . . If the order was 
executed in a manner inconsistent with this duty, it was also performed 
with scienter.’”77 
The Third Circuit’s decision came on the heels of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Basic v. Levinson78 that significantly liberalized Rule 10b-5 
litigation. In Basic, the class of investors who had sold stock brought a 
claim against the issuing company arguing that it had traded on the basis 
of a material misrepresentation.79 Defendants asserted that the class as a 
whole could not provide class-wide proof of reliance and therefore should 
not be certified under Rule 23.80 The Court nevertheless accepted a 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. For a history of Rule 10b-5, see ABA Sec. of Corp., Banking & Business Law, 
Conference on the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967). 
 74. For the interesting story behind the drafting and passage of Rule 10b-5, see ABA Sec. of 
Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, supra note 73, at 921-23. 
 75. The private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 is now engrained in U.S. securities 
jurisprudence and “constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s requirements.” 
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 
(1976) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)). 
 76. 135 F.3d at 270 (citing Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1991)). The 
Supreme Court has created or articulated these requirements over time in a series of cases. Basic, 485 
U.S. at 231 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (describing the 
“manipulative or deceptive” requirement); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, (outlining the “in 
connection with purchase or sale” requirement); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (describing the 
duty to disclose); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (discussing 
scienter)).  
 77. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 173-74. 
 78. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 79. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228-29. The plaintiffs allege that Basic, Inc. made certain public 
statements that misstated the company’s position with respect to merger negotiations. Id. Plaintiffs 
contend that, because of the misstatements, the price at which they sold their shares was artificially 
depressed. Id. 
 80. Id. at 242. 
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presumption of reliance in order to certify the class.81 It noted that the 
evolution of the securities industry required securities regulation to evolve 
also.82 The Court went on to justify the presumption on the grounds of 
“fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy.”83 In 
particular, the Court explained that liberalizing Rule 10b-5 litigation was 
acceptable and necessary because it “[was] consistent with, and, by 
facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional policy 
embodied in the 1934 Act.”84 Thus, the Court relaxed the requirements of a 
Rule 10b-5 class action suit specifically to promote private enforcement.85 
D. Fiduciary Obligations and the Duty of Best Execution 
At its most basic level, the securities market is bifurcated into the 
primary and the secondary markets. The primary market essentially serves 
one purpose: to facilitate the generation of capital.86 The secondary 
market, of which the NBBO is part, serves as a means of liquidity among 
investors, but also aids in the formation of capital.87 Both markets bring 
groups together under a common set of rules, thereby making the 
 81. Id. at 250. The Court reasoned that “[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each 
member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding 
with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.” 
Ultimately, the Court found the presumption necessary to facilitate Rule 10b-5 enforcement. Id. at 242. 
Because “[p]resumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct 
proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult,” extending the presumption of reliance was 
necessary. Id. at 245. 
 82. Id. at 243-44 (stating “our understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement must 
encompass [the changes in the industry]”). 
 83. Id. at 245. 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. Concededly, the Basic court justifies its decision, in part, on the basis of the “fraud on the 
market theory.” Id. at 241-42. The theory relies on the efficient market hypothesis, which claims that a 
stock’s price reflects the market’s evaluation of all public information about the company. As the 
Court described it: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed 
securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material 
information regarding the company and its business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore 
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements 
. . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of 
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on 
misrepresentations. 
485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). For further 
discussion of the efficient market hypothesis, see Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review 
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). The plaintiffs’ case in Newton does not rely on 
the “fraud on the market” theory and therefore the Basic decision is not directly applicable. 
 86. POSER, supra note 40, at 1-5. 
 87. Id. 
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accumulation of capital vastly more efficient. Due to regulations, however, 
not everyone can buy or sell securities directly;88 instead they must use an 
agent. Thus, would-be investors utilize professionals such as broker-
dealers89 to serve as “go betweens” in order to invest money into the 
market. Investors place their faith in the broker-dealer to act in their best 
interests:90 this is virtually identical to the traditional agency relationship.91 
Indeed, there is a large amount of literature that argues that a broker-dealer 
assumes the fiduciary obligations for any client simply by virtue of the 
fact that the broker-dealer is in business.92 Agency places upon the broker-
 88. Id. § 1.01. 
 89. “A ‘broker’ is a person (either an individual or a firm) engaged in the business of effecting 
securities transactions for others, and a ‘dealer’ is a person engaged in the regular business of buying 
and selling securities for his own account.” POSER, supra note 40, at § 1.01, pages 1-6. Furthermore, 
“since most firms act both as brokers and as dealers, they are usually referred to as broker-dealers.” Id. 
at 1-6, n.13 (citing SEC Ann. Rep. 27 (1999) (this Note will also refer to firms as broker-dealers). But 
broker-dealers are “market makers” in that they provide their own money in order to assure liquidity. 
Thus, they can actually buy the security from their client and then sell the security on the market, 
capturing the spread between the prices and making a profit. However, the inflated spread that results 
from the selling of securities at sub-NBBO prices to capture the spread between NBBO and NBBO 
alternative prices (as is alleged by the plaintiffs) is not generally included in the ordinary spread that 
becomes the broker-dealer's profit. 
 90. Because investors are not allowed to trade themselves and generally are not informed about 
the processes of the securities industry, they rely on the broker-dealer to act in their best interests to 
select the appropriate method and timing of execution. This has been analogized to the relationship 
between the buyer and real estate agent. Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1031-32. See also infra notes 87-105 
and accompanying text. The NYSE and AMEX also require broker-dealers to abide by the duty of best 
execution. See NYSE Rule 123A, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2123A.41, at 2748 (adopted June 19, 
1969) (“A broker handling a marker order is to use due diligence to execute the order at the best price 
or prices available to him under the published market procedures of the Exchange.”); AMEX Rule 
156(a), 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9296, at 2467-3 (adopted May 13, 1965) (same) (cited in 
Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1067 note 155.). Additionally, the NASD also requires that its brokers abide 
by the duty: 
 In any transaction for or with a customer, a member and persons associated with a 
member shall use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best inter-dealer market for the subject 
security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as 
favorable as possible under the prevailing market conditions. 
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) ¶ 2151 at 2024 (adopted May 1, 1968) (quoted in 
Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1067 note 156). See also Hazen, 3 Law Sec. Reg. § 14.13 (4th ed.) (2001). 
 91. POSER, supra note 40, at § 2.01, pp. 2-3. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 424, 
supra note 1. 
 92. This is the so-called “shingle theory” of the relationship between the broker-dealer and the 
client. For commentary about the “shingle theory,” see HAZEN, supra note 90, at 14.15[3]. See also In 
the Matter of Richardt-Alyn & Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9099, 70 SEC Docket 1703, 
Release No. 10-151 (Sept. 30, 1999); Order Execution Obligations, 62 SEC Docket at 2242-44; 
Randal W. Quinn, Déjà vu All Over Again: The SEC’s Return to Agency Theory in Regulating Broker-
Dealers, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 61 (1990). Regardless, the parties agreed in Newton that the 
broker-dealer undertakes the order subject to the duty of best execution when they accept an order 
without price restrictions. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. at 394. 
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dealer a tremendous fiduciary duty to the client,93 especially given 
potential conflicts of interest peculiar to the broker-dealer.94 Both the SEC 
and the judiciary have addressed the common law duties arising from 
agency in the investment context.95 
These fiduciary obligations are essential to the securities markets. As 
one commentator explained, “the existence of the fiduciary principle is 
central to the health and viability of the financial markets.”96 Because the 
client places such a tremendous amount of faith—and more importantly 
for the securities market, a tremendous amount of money—in the broker-
dealer, she must be safeguarded by fiduciary principles. The existence of 
the fiduciary obligations to the client assures that her transactions will be 
conducted solely for her benefit, not the broker-dealer’s. This protection 
 93. Id. As one commentator has described it,  
[The broker-dealer] is held to rigorous duties of loyalty and care: [the broker-dealer] must 
avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the beneficiary’s; his duties must be exercised 
with the utmost good faith and integrity; and he must employ such skill and judgment as 
might reasonably be expected of persons skilled in his calling. 
POSER, supra note 40, at § 2.01 (citing Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988)). See also Louis Loss, The SEC and the 
Broker-Dealer, 1 VAND. L. REV. 516, 522 (1948). Perhaps Judge Benjamin Cardozo articulated this 
standard most eloquently: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in the workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, 
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is 
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity 
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of 
particular exceptions (citation omitted). Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries 
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. Div. 1928) (emphasis added). For further discussion of 
the duty of best execution, see Farrell, supra note 18, at 1066-70; Furey and Kiesewetter, On-line 
Broker-Dealers: Conducting Compliance Reviews in Cyberspace, 56 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1475-76 
(2001); American Law Institute, American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Trends in 
SEC Enforcement and Inspections of Investment Advisors, SGO38 ALI-ABA 209, 233-34 (citing In 
the Matter of Marc N. German, File No. 3-9032 (Aug. 5, 1997); In the Matter of Portfolio 
Management Consultants, Inc. and Kenneth S. Phillips, Advisors Act Rel. No. 37376 (June 27, 1996); 
Public Proceedings Instituted Against Marc N. German, Advisors Act Rel. No. 1567 (June 27, 1996)). 
See also Tennenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC Release 34-37619A, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 48290, 48322-23 (Sept. 12, 1996); SEC Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market 
Developments (1994), available at 1994 SEC LEXIS 136; In re E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 25,887, 41 SEC Docket (CCH) 413, 418 (July 6, 1988). 
 For a description of the duty arising out of the fiduciary relationship between the broker-dealer 
and the client, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985); Magnum Corp. v. Lehman 
Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 794 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 94. The complexity of the OTC creates numerous possible conflicts of interest, such as the 
broker-dealer's ability to capture the client's profit by retrading. 
 95. See supra note 93. However, the SEC has never clearly defined the duty of best execution. 
Furey & Kiesewetter, supra note 93, at 1475. 
 
 96. POSER, supra note 40, at § 2.01, pages 2-4. 
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extends not only to whether the transaction is executed, but also to when 
and how it is executed. Thus, fiduciary obligations protect the invaluable 
integrity of the market.97 
Among the duties owed to the client by the broker-dealer is the duty of 
best execution.98 The duty of best execution is the assurance to the client 
that her interests are the sole motivation behind actions taken with her 
securities. Indeed, the duty of best execution has been called the 
“cornerstone of market integrity.”99 Although the language used to 
articulate the duty varies, the essence of the duty is largely universal: 
reasonable efforts to execute the trade on the terms most advantageous to 
the client.100 Judge Stapleton, writing the en banc opinion in Newton I, 
described the duty of best execution as follows: 
The duty of best execution, which predates the federal securities 
laws, has its roots in the common law agency obligations of 
undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an agent owes to his 
principal. Since it is understood by all that the client-principal seeks 
 97. The integrity of the markets is absolutely crucial to their proper function. The market must 
assure those who invest their money that it is legitimate or else they will not invest and the markets 
will fail. Not only does the integrity of the market aid investors in their initial investment, it also gives 
some degree of certainty to the system. Assuming that the efficient market hypothesis holds some 
weight, it is only when the market reacts to that information in a genuine, untainted manner that 
investors can truly understand the signals sent by the market and therefore invest with some degree of 
confidence. Thus, the market’s integrity serves these two, intimately intertwined functions: to entice 
investors by putting them at ease and to promote efficiency by allowing for some transparency in the 
market prices. It was this goal of protecting the legitimacy and integrity of the markets that motivated 
the passage of the securities acts in the 1930s. This goal remains the driving force behind securities 
jurisprudence today. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text. In the context of Newton, the 
market’s integrity is threatened because the investors are unaware of the higher costs they are paying 
due to the defendants’ policies. Yet, because Rule 10b-5 is a rule about disclosure, liability for a 
violation of the duty of best execution is removed if the broker-dealer discloses in advance his 
intention not to fulfill the duty. That, however, could create competitive pressures for the broker-dealer 
because clients might then migrate to broker-dealers who promise compliance with the duty. 
 98. There is some disagreement over whether the duty of best execution is truly a fiduciary duty. 
POSER, supra note 40, at § 2.03[B], pages 2-58 (noting that some jurisdictions do not consider the duty 
of best execution to be “of a fiduciary nature,” whereas others find that the duty arises from fiduciary 
obligations, which is also the opinion of the SEC) (citing Index Futures Group v. Ross, 557 N.E.2d 
344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1990); Sinclair v. Securities and Exch. 
Commn., 444 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1971); First Union Brokerage v. Milos, 717 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (citing Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir. 
1987) and Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 
1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Berki v. Renolds Sec., Inc., 560 P.2d 282, 286 (Or. 1977)). 
 99. DIV. OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, BEST EXECUTION IN MARKET 
2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS, V-I (1994). 
 100. The duty of best execution can generally be divided into three component parts: “the duty to 
execute promptly; the duty to execute in the appropriate market; and the duty to obtain the best price.” 
POSER, supra note 40, § 2.03[B], at 2-58. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p997 wanamaker note book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1012 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:997 
 
 
 
 
 
his own economic gain and the purpose of the agency is to help the 
client-principal achieve that objective, the broker-dealer, absent 
instructions to the contrary, is expected to use reasonable efforts to 
maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction.101 
This duty exists regardless of whether the broker-dealer is acting as the 
agent or the principal.102 
As noted in the Introduction, changes in technology create difficulties 
in determining whether a broker-dealer has fulfilled the duty of best 
execution.103 The SEC has not made the principal’s determination easier. 
Rather than expand the scope or clarity of the duty of best execution, the 
SEC has changed the mechanisms used in the system.104 
 101. 135 F.3d at 270. However, other considerations are important in determining if a trade is 
executed in compliance with the duty of best execution. The en banc opinion expressly noted these 
additional considerations: 
Other terms in addition to price are also relevant to best execution. In determining how to 
execute a client’s order, a broker-dealer must take into account order size, trading 
characteristics of the security, speed of execution, clearing costs, and the cost and difficulty of 
executing an order in a particular market. 
Id. at 270 n.2 (citing Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 33,026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52934, 
52937-38 (Oct. 13, 1993)). But in so noting, the court relegated them to lesser importance. Id. As the 
passage from Newton I indicates, the Third Circuit reduced the duty of best execution in this case to 
the duty to find the most advantageous price for the client. Id. The court avoided discussing other 
considerations, indicating that:  
When the plaintiffs state that better “prices” were reasonably available from sources other 
than the NBBO, we understand that to mean that, given an evaluation of price as well as all of 
the relevant terms, the trade would be better executed through a source of liquidity other than 
the NBBO (e.g. SelectNet, Instinet, in-house limit orders or market orders held by the 
defendants, or limit orders placed by the public in the Small Order Exchange System). 
Similarly, for convenience, we use the phrases “best reasonably available price” and “best 
terms” interchangeably. 
Id. See also, Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1038; Furey and Kiesewetter, supra note 93, at 1475. 
 102. Id. See also Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 760 (“[the agency obligation] does not dissolve 
when the broker/dealer acts in its capacity as a principal”); In re: E.F. Hutton & Co., Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 25887, [1988 Transfer Binder Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,303 (1988) (“a 
broker/dealer’s determination to execute an order as a principal or agent cannot be ‘a means by which 
the broker may elect whether or not the law will impose fiduciary standards upon him in the actual 
circumstances of any given relationship or transaction.’”) (quoting Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 
250 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
 103. See POSER, supra note 40, § 2.03[B], at 2-57. 
 104. The SEC has moved to alter the system in a variety of ways. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.11Ac1-1 
to 1-4 (2000); Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 
48290, 48306-16 (Sept. 12, 1996). However, these changes do not entirely address the issues of this 
case. At its most fundamental level, Newton asks how the client is to assure that the broker-dealer has 
fulfilled the duty of best execution when technological advances allow for potentially superior, 
reasonably available alternatives to the NBBO. While adjustments to the NBBO or changes in the 
systems that must be consulted can temporarily alleviate some of the confusion, the same issue arises 
again when a new technology becomes available. To expand the NBBO or to initiate NAqcess, 
although it might resolve the dispute for the particular set of facts, does not resolve the question for 
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E. The Requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 
In order to obtain certification for a class under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, the proposed class must meet several requirements.105 These 
requirements are divided into two categories. The first are the 
“prerequisites” for all classes under Rule 23(a).106 Assuming a group 
satisfies those requirements, they then must meet one of three sets of 
requirements under Rule 23(b).107 The plaintiffs in Newton moved for 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).108  
Under Rule 23(b)(3), a group must meet the “twin requirements of 
predominance and superiority.”109 The Third Circuit described these 
requirements in Newton II, noting that: 
future developments. Moreover, the crucial issue in Newton is whether class actions should be used as 
a means of private enforcement of Rule 10b-5. The new regulations do not speak to the private 
enforcement issue or provide guidance as to the determination of individual damages in such cases. 
Finally, these particular plaintiffs allege defendants committed a harm against them. The SEC does not 
offer these plaintiffs a mechanism for retrospective relief. Not only would full adjudication of Newton 
not interfere with the regulatory scheme adopted by the SEC, it is the essentially the only mechanism 
available to plaintiffs seeking relief. Prohibiting plaintiffs from seeking private relief as a class stymies 
enforcement of Rule 10b-5 by effectively removing one crucial component of the enforcement 
scheme. 
 105. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b) (1998). 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) provides: 
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides for three categories of classes that may be maintained. 
23(b)(1) allows for class certification if not certifying would subject the defendant to multiple suits 
that could produce multiple standards for judging their behavior. Rule 23(b)(2) allows for certification 
for suits aimed at injunctive or declaratory relief. Rule 23(b)(3) provides certification for class actions 
seeking damages in which the common questions for the class are such that joint litigation is deemed 
acceptable. 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) provides: 
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites 
of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of 
the class individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action. 
 109. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 186. 
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[t]he predominance inquiry demands “that questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members” . . . . Superiority calls 
for a determination that a class action is the best method of 
achieving a “fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”110 
This demands an analysis of the group that extends beyond the 
requirements of 23(a) and compels a “close look at the case before it is 
accepted as a class action.”111 Furthermore, Rule 23(b)(3) offers several 
factors that weigh into the “close look,” such as the individual interests of 
each class member and the likely level of difficulty in managing the 
class.112 As the Third Circuit noted in In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practice Litig.,113 “[I]ssues common to the class must predominate 
over individual issues, and the class action device must be superior to 
other means of handling the litigation.”114 
The predominance inquiry measures whether the class is “sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant certification.”115 The Third Circuit noted that this 
inquiry is more demanding than the commonality analysis in Rule 23(a) 
and requires “more than a common claim.”116 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court’s suggestion that “predominance is a test readily met in certain cases 
alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws” 
should not go overlooked.117 
The superiority analysis inquires into whether the litigation is best 
pursued as a class in terms of judicial efficiency.118 This analysis 
fundamentally involves two questions, (1) will the proposed class be 
manageable;119 and (2) will adjudicating the action as a class reduce the 
 110. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
 111. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 186 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 615 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) lists the factors to be considered: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense 
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability 
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely 
to be encountered in the management of the class action. 
Newton II, 259 F.3d at 186 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
 113. 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 114. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 186-87 (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices 
Litig., 148 F.3d at 313-14) (internal quotations omitted). 
 115. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
 116. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 187. 
 117. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citing Comm. Note, FED R. CIV. P. 23) (emphasis added). 
 118. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 119. Id. (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). 
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number of individual actions?120  
With some context for the plaintiffs’ claims and the requirements 
necessary to certify the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3), this discussion now shifts to the court’s analysis in Newton. 
Specifically, it examines how the Third Circuit pieced together the issues 
in Newton II as compared to the district court and its earlier analysis in 
Newton I. 
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN NEWTON II 
Having essentially breathed life into an area of the law by extending 
the presumption of reliance for Rule 10b-5 claims in Newton I, the Third 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court.121 Faced with a motion to 
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), the district court held that the suit 
was not fit for a class action.122 On appeal, the panel in Newton II, 
although disagreeing with certain portions of the district court’s analysis, 
generally upheld the lower court’s denial.123  
The en banc decision in Newton I provided the analytical framework 
for the district court.124 In Merrill I, the district court initially held that the 
plaintiffs did not rely on a “material misrepresentation.”125 The Newton I 
court rejected this conclusion, holding that if the plaintiffs could prove 
their allegations, the failure to disclose could constitute a “material 
misrepresentation.”126 Furthermore, it extended the presumption of 
reliance to such cases like this one.127 The circuit court then returned the 
case to the district court requiring that, in order to state a claim under Rule 
10b-5, the class must prove: 
(1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) scienter on the part of the 
defendant; (3) reliance on the misrepresentation; and (4) damage 
resulting from the misrepresentation.128  
 120. Id. (noting specifically that “we have recognized that adjudicating Rule 10b-5 securities 
claims as a class action satisfies superiority only if the litigation results in fewer individual actions”). 
 121. Newton I, 135 F.3d 266. 
 122. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. 391. 
 123. Newton II, 259 F.3d 154. 
 124. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 272-73. 
 125. Merrill Lynch I, 911 F. Supp. at 771-72. 
 126. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 272-73. 
 127. Id. at 266. 
 128. Id. 
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The district court turned to questions of reliance and damages to decide 
the plaintiffs’ motion for 23(b)(3) class certification.129 
The district court rejected the motion. First, relying on Kyriazi v. W. 
Elec. Co.,130 the court held that “[c]ertification of a class under Rule 23 
cannot relieve the individual class members from establishing each 
element of their claims.”131 Then quoting from Illinois v. Ampress Brick 
Co.,132 the court noted that “[t]he party seeking to represent a class must 
establish that all members of the purported class have suffered 
damages.”133 Essentially, the district court held that, in order to be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the purported class must establish via class-wide 
proof that each member of the class satisfied the elements of the 10b-5 
claim.134 Reasoning that because class-wide evidence of reliance and 
damages was not provided to its satisfaction, the court concluded that the 
purported class not only failed the predominance and superiority analysis 
under Rule 23(b)(3),135 it also failed to meet many of the prerequisites 
under Rule 23(a).136 
On appeal, the Third Circuit generally approved of the district court’s 
analysis. Although it disagreed with much of the court’s Rule 23(a) 
reasoning,137 the panel agreed that the proposed class failed to satisfy both 
the predominance and the superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3).138 
In terms of predominance, the court’s analysis turned on the 
determination that “automated execution of orders at the NBBO listed 
price did not necessarily injure each class member.”139 The court reached 
this conclusion because, first, there was no class-wide proof that the 
alternative sources of liquidity provided a superior price to each class 
member.140 Second, because the other factors that bear upon whether a 
 129. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. at 395. 
 130. 647 F.2d 388, 394-95 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 131. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. at 395. 
 132. 67 F.R.D. 457 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
 133. Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. at 395 (quoting Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. at 460) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 134. Id. at 396. 
 135. Id. at 398. 
 136. Id. at 397. 
 137. The Third Circuit rejected the district court’s Rule 23(a) analysis, holding that the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites set a lower threshold than the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3). Newton II, 259 F.3d at 181. It held that the proposed class met the lower standards in Rule 
23(a), but not the heightened Rule 23(b)(3) standards. Id. at 187-93. 
 138. Id. at 193. For a general discussion of the court’s certification analysis, see In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 219 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Andrews Sec. Litig. & Reg. Rep., supra note 17. 
 139. Id. at 187. 
 140. Id. 
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service provides the best execution vary from class member to class 
member and from trade to trade, the duty of best execution is a highly 
individualized standard.141 Therefore, the court held that determining 
whether or not there was a breach of the duty of best execution that 
damaged each individual class member would be a “Herculean task, 
involving hundreds of millions of transactions” that “counsels against 
finding predominance.”142 
The court additionally rejected plaintiffs’ proposed formula for 
calculating damages.143 The court viewed the plaintiffs' formula as a 
means of skirting the predominance requirement.144 Regardless of whether 
Dr. Mendelson, the plaintiffs’ expert witness, could create a workable 
formula, the court was persuaded that the defendants’ right to assert 
unique defenses for each class member threatened to turn the class action 
into a series of mini-trials over each member’s proof of economic loss.145 
Emphasizing that “[p]roof of injury (whether or not an injury occurred at 
all) must be distinguished from calculation of damages (which determines 
the actual value of the injury),” the court decided that providing a formula 
to calculate damages does not suffice for class-wide proof of damages.146 
Rather, the class must establish class-wide damages via class-wide 
proof.147 The court distinguished the “fraud-on-the-market” theory148 in 
which defendants’ actions alone produce a harm to the investors, 
regardless of the investors’ actions, and demanded proof of individualized 
damages in order to meet the requirements of Rule 10b-5.149 It analogized 
the case to a mass tort, in which each individual’s pre-tort and post-tort 
conditions were unique and had a significant bearing upon the existence of 
 141. Id. For a discussion of the other factors see supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 142. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 187. 
 143. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Hiam Mendelson, a NASD market expert, claimed that he 
could “devise a formula which measures classwide damages and from which a plan of allocation can 
be constructed.” Brief for Appellants at 41, Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001) (No. 
00-1586) (citing JA1450-51, Mendelson Cert. Decl. at ¶ 10). While the details are not provided, the 
formula would be established “using ‘well-established statistical techniques’ based on his ‘familiarity 
with statistical relationships which can be powerfully applied to the relevant market data.” Id. 
Presumably, the formula would not provide a uniform amount to each member of the class, but would 
rather provide differing amounts based on a variety of factors. 
 144. 259 F.3d at 187. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 188. 
 147. Id. at 190. The court explained that the plaintiffs must establish proof of damages for all class 
members via class-wide evidence or else justify a presumption of economic loss. Id. The court was not 
persuaded that plaintiffs had accomplished either in Newton. Id. 
 148. See supra note 85. 
 149. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 188-89. 
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an injury, as well as the degree of injury.150 Finally, as noted above, even 
if the class could have provided class-wide evidence of injury, the court 
held that the defendants could still have produced individualized defenses 
against each class member.151 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiffs failed to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).152 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy to a deceptive sales case, 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig.153 Reasoning that 
Prudential was certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the court was 
not persuaded by the analogy.154 The court then proclaimed that Rule 10b-
5 claims satisfy superiority only if the litigation results in fewer 
individualized actions.155 Having already determined that each class 
member would have to prove damages individually,156 the court concluded 
that certifying the class would not “reduce litigation” or promote judicial 
efficiency.157 
The court also found that the proposed class failed to meet the 
superiority reqirement of Rule 23(b)(3).158 The court articulated the 
standard that “class action must represent the best ‘available method for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’”159 This provided 
justification for the court to examine the potential difficulties with respect 
to the class.160 The court was persuaded that the threat of individualized 
questions about damages posed a risk of turning the case into a “mind-
boggling undertaking.”161 The plaintiffs contended that, because the 
amounts of injury were so small, a class action represented the only way to 
obtain relief. The court rejected this position.162 Additionally, the court 
cited general manageability problems with regard to a class the size of 
plaintiffs’ proposed class.163  The court believed that the “specter of 
 150. Id. at 190-91 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). In Prudential, the Third Circuit approved the certification of a 
class solely for the purposes of settlement. Id. at 290. The class alleged a uniform deceptive sales 
practice that defrauded eight million clients by failing to disclose certain practices. Id. at 289. The 
class claimed no personal injuries and there were no future classes. Id. 
 154. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 155. Id. (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620). 
 156. Id. at 190. 
 157. Id. at 192. 
 158. Id. at 191-93. 
 159. Id. at 191 (citing Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch II, 191 F.R.D. at 398). 
 162. Id. The court noted that large financial institutions might have a large enough interest to 
move forward with the litigation independent of a class. Id. 
 163. Id. at 191-92 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. 591, and In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
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adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims at trial [was], at the very least, daunting.”164 
These “insurmountable manageability problems” and the “hydraulic 
pressure on defendants to settle” provided further rationale for the 
holding.165 Because of the threat of individual defenses and general 
manageability concerns, the court concluded that the proposed class failed 
to satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).166 
With the court’s analysis in mind, this discussion now provides, first, a 
critique of the court’s analysis and, second, a potentially better avenue to 
serve the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Even though the Third Circuit’s analysis in Newton is reasonable, it 
produces a result that runs counter to the regime’s goals and the trend in 
Rule 10b-5 cases.167 The decision is misguided for two reasons. First, 
although at first blush the logic appears sound, a further look reveals 
flaws. Second, the decision departs from the goals of the ’34 Act as well 
as recent Rule 10b-5 decisions.168 
As noted above, the court declined to certify the class on the basis that 
the proposed class failed to satisfy the “predominance” and the 
“superiority” requirements for a class action.169 However, the court’s 
analysis is flawed with regard to both requirements. 
The court’s discussion of the predominance requirement puts the cart 
before the horse.170 The court found that the “Hurculean task” of 
calculating individual damages overwhelmed the common questions.171 
Yet, the common issue for the class was whether a broker-dealer fulfilled 
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997)). 
 164. Id. at 192. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
 168. In addition, the court also declined the opportunity to add needed clarity to the duty of best 
execution. See supra notes 86-105 and accompanying text. While the “reasonable efforts” standard 
provides some guidance, certifying this class forces the court to confront the issue with respect to non-
NBBO sources of liquidity. Despite the fact that one may prefer that the S.E.C., not the judiciary, 
define the duty of best execution, the SEC’s decision to simply incorporate the services in question 
into the NBBO only delays further definition, but it does not avoid it. Moreover, such a decision could 
have effects on the controversial issue of payment for order flow. See Ferrell, supra note 18. In the 
end, although the decision certainly does not foreclose future cases that can provide further definition 
to the duty of best execution, this case presented just such an opportunity and it should have been 
embraced. 
 169. See supra notes 120-66 and accompanying text. 
 170. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 187. 
 171. Id. 
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the duty of best execution when that execution systematically ignored 
potentially superior prices.172 The broker-dealer should be judged with 
regard to her process of execution rather than the outcome of it, i.e., did 
the broker-dealer use “reasonable efforts” to obtain the best execution?173 
This question, common to all members of the class, is the crucial issue in 
the litigation because it is an initial hurdle that each plaintiff must 
surpass.174 It is in this sense that common questions predominate. 
Furthermore, the court’s analysis acknowledged that the duty of best 
execution is client-specific and that the duty is defined by multiple factors 
that are unique to each client.175 It is hard to square this with the decision 
to insulate the defendants’ policies that systematically treat each client as 
if they were identical.176 Indeed, if the duty of best execution is client-
specific, why do the firms maintain uniform policies to fulfill the duty? 
And why should the court rigidly apply a certification standard that it 
understands as requiring individualized proof of damages when it is clear 
that the defendants uniformly failed to meet their obligations? The Third 
Circuit did not adequately answer these questions. Instead, the court 
ignored its own admonition to distinguish proof of injury from calculation 
of damages.177 Because the plaintiffs claimed a breach of the duty of best 
execution with respect to each client,178 the evidence of injury should have 
come from common proof that the defendants uniformly failed to fulfill 
the duty of best execution based on the system they used. In other words, 
the plaintiffs contended that the harm arose from the process by which 
each client’s trade was executed, not its outcome.179 To demand more from 
the plaintiffs would be to demand common calculation of damages, which 
the court cautioned to avoid.180 Therefore, the requisite evidence should 
demonstrate that the system did not adapt to individual differences or 
consider the potential for better prices.181 If anything, it is the proof of 
 172. Id. at 173. 
 173. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. 
 174. If the court holds that there is no breach of the duty of best execution on this theory, then the 
class as a whole fails to allege a material misrepresentation and therefore has no basis for a Rule 10b-5 
claim. If the court holds that the duty of best execution is fulfilled based on outcomes rather than 
process—price rather than “reasonable efforts”—then certification cannot be given and each individual 
outcome must be analyzed. 
 175. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 270. 
 176. Id. at 269. 
 177. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 187-88. 
 178. Newton I, 135 F.3d at 270. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 187-88. 
 181. Evidence is presented via proof of the firms’ uniform policies. Id. Such evidence would 
establish that, for each member of the class, under the defendants system the broker-dealers did not, 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/14
p997 wanamaker note book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] CLASS ACTIONS AND RULE 10b-5 1021 
 
 
 
 
 
injury which is common and the calculation of damages which is 
individualized, assuming rejection of the plaintiffs’ formula for calculating 
damages.182 Thus, with respect to proof of injuries, common questions 
predominate. 
The court’s superiority analysis is also flawed.183 The court first 
asserted that certifying the class would lead to a larger burden on the 
judicial system than not certifying because a more complicated 
examination of damages would be required.184 Secondly, the court 
concluded that to certify the class would put undue “hydraulic pressure” 
on the defendants to settle.185 The former argument sacrifices justice in 
order to ease the burden on the court system and the latter misplaces the 
burden on the plaintiffs as a matter of policy.186 
The court reasoned that, even if plaintiffs can prove the injury with 
class-wide evidence, the defendants retain the right to claim individualized 
defenses.187 In this situation, however, because of the individualized nature 
of the duty of best execution standard and the uniform policies that the 
defendants applied to achieve that standard (always using the NBBO), 
their defense would stand or fall for the class as a whole. Because the duty 
of best execution is about the process of execution, not the outcome,188 the 
defendants’ individualized defenses would never be successful. In other 
words, the potential for individualized defenses does not alter the common 
question: whether the duty of best execution is fulfilled via uniform 
execution policies. This question still predominates for the class. 
In terms of the increased litigation stemming from certification, the 
court must assume that the refusal to certify the proposed class sounds the 
death knell for at least some of the class members. If any of these claims 
are legitimate, the ruling sacrifices justice to some degree. Even if the 
court is correct in asserting that determining damages would require it to 
look to each individual member in isolation, it would be no more 
burdensome on the court than if each individual pressed their claims 
could not, and never intended to use “reasonable efforts” to seek out the best prices for their clients. 
Accordingly, the failure to disclose constitutes a material misrepresentation or omission under Rule 
10b-5. 
 182. This is because the calculation is subject to each security’s price on the NBBO and its 
alternatives. 
 183. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text. 
 184. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 191-92. 
 185. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 186. As discussed below, the first argument inevitably leaves those who have legitimate claims 
without a viable means of obtaining relief. The second is simply an unwise policy. 
 187. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 188. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text. 
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separately. Indeed, combining them would be more efficient for two 
reasons. First, a class would unify the counsel and strategies. Second, it 
would avoid repetitive liability litigation that may be followed by the 
damage assessment. Thus, in order for there to truly be an efficiency 
benefit to the court in requiring each member to press their own claims, 
the court must assume that there are many individuals who would not 
continue their cases.189 In other words, the argument presumes that the 
denial of certification prevents the filing of at least some, if not all, claims. 
Presumably some of those claims would be legitimate.190 Therefore the 
court sacrifices justice for efficiency. 
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, the court arguably misplaces the 
burden in order to avoid the “hydraulic pressure” on the defendants to 
settle the case that arises from certification.191 Although this argument is 
logical, given the protective purpose of the ’34 Act,192 the statute arguably 
demands the burden of this pressure be placed on the broker-dealers, not 
the investors. The firms are better able to bear this burden than the 
individual investors.193 Most importantly, even though the thousands of 
investors lost relatively small amounts of money,194 that money was 
concentrated in one beneficiary.195 Placing the burden on the clients 
insulates the broker-dealers so long as they defraud the clients of only 
small amounts of money.196 This creates a collective action problem in that 
the suit is likely not worth the expense if the individual is required to bear 
it alone,197 but might be worth the expense as either a member of a group 
 189. In order to have an efficiency gain, the court must assume that there is a large number of 
plaintiffs who will no longer assert a claim. If it is correct that the litigation will devolve into a series 
of individual trials over damages, then the trial would be a combination of the single litigation over the 
common liability issues and then individualized damage issues. The denial of certification would 
require everyone who brings a claim to fully litigate each issue. Thus, in order for there to be an 
efficiency gain, the court must assume that the number of people who bring their claim, regardless of 
certification, is so greatly outweighed by the number of individuals who, without certification, will not 
assert their claim at all that, when aggregated, their full trials still do not consume more judicial 
resources than the single class action. 
 190. Given the unique nature of the duty of best execution, this presumption is virtually 
undeniable. 
 191. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 192. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text. 
 193. The firms are better able to bear the burden because they are financially capable and retain 
in-house counsel. 
 194. See supra note 29. 
 195. Plaintiffs even claimed that defendants’ actions were motivated by generating extra profit. 
See supra notes 54 and 67. 
 196. The broker-dealer is insulated because the cost/benefit analysis for litigation only presses the 
claims if it is worth it. 
 197. See supra note 4. 
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or if the individual can benefit from the success of another plaintiff. As it 
stands, however, the cost-benefit analysis of individual claims discourages 
their filing. In terms of the policy implications, the court should certify the 
class and place the burden on the broker-dealers, even if it places 
“hydraulic pressure” on them to settle.198 
Aside from the flaws in the court’s logic, the denial of certification 
ignores the purpose of the ’34 Act and the teachings of recent Rule 10b-5 
decisions.199 Given the broad goals of protecting the integrity of the 
market and promoting investor confidence through disclosure,200 
impediments to enforcement ought to be viewed with skepticism. The 
court’s decision in this case should be viewed similarly. First, it 
acknowledges that it is reducing litigation in the name of efficiency. 
Second, because of the collective action problems and the small individual 
amounts involved,201 a class is critical to bringing relief to the injured 
plaintiffs.202 Third, it decreases deterrence by reducing the threat of 
litigation. All of these leave class members uncompensated for their 
injuries and future investors uncertain. Since the Supreme Court has 
tended to broaden, not narrow, Rule 10b-5 litigation, it seems appropriate 
to do so here. Concededly, there is no “fraud on the market”-type harm 
here, but the market as a whole is injured by the unpunished fraud. 
Protecting the integrity of the market and protecting investors from fraud 
is the thrust of Rule 10b-5 and the court ignores this goal by denying 
certification. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The court should have certified the class for all, or at least most, of the 
litigation. Initially, the predominant question in this case regards the 
fulfillment of the duty of best execution via the defendants’ uniform 
policies. This duty is one of “reasonable efforts” and is thus one of 
process, not outcome. It is not the calculation of damages that is crucial, 
but the proof of injury—proof that will be given with class-wide evidence 
that the defendants systematically failed to fulfill their duty of best 
execution—that determines predominance (applying a uniform policy to 
satisfy a variable duty). If this is not satisfactory, the court could have 
 198. This is not to assume that defendants are liable, but only that they are better able to bear the 
costs and, if they are indeed liable, then the judicial system is much more likely to deliver justice. 
 199. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text. 
 200. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
 201. See supra note 29. 
 202. See supra note 4. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p997 wanamaker note book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1024 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:997 
 
 
 
 
 
simply certified the class for the sole purpose of litigating liability.203 
Limited certification strikes a better balance between the desire to keep the 
justice system available to those with grievances and the efficiency 
demands of the court than does outright rejection of certification. 
Certification of the class better serves the protective purposes of the 
’34 Act. Rather than insulate the broker-dealers from the harm caused to 
their clients from their potentially fraudulent conduct, the ’34 Act requires 
that the plaintiffs be given a chance to protect their interests. Because of 
the lack of enforcement without class action, certification is critical to 
protecting market integrity and investor confidence. Limited certification 
does not allow frivolous claims, because an allegation of fraud must be 
proven, but the denial of certification removes a needed method of 
protection.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s decision to uphold the denial of certification in 
Newton is problematic in that it removes one important avenue that injured 
investors had to seek relief. In doing so, it also decreases the deterrent 
effect of liability for violations of Rule 10b-5. But the court’s hands were 
not tied. Rather than conflate proof of damages and calculation of 
damages, it could have reasoned that a uniform policy aimed to fulfill a 
varying standard fails to such an extent that it warrants finding 
predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). Although this proposal 
suggests a relaxed standard for damages in this case, it nevertheless better 
serves the goals of Rule 10b-5. The choice appears to be between strictly 
adhering to certification rules and better serving the ’34 Act. Even though 
the Third Circuit makes a strong argument for its decision, the choice 
removes one critical check investors have over their agents. 
Brian J. Wanamaker∗ 
 203. The partial certification is not new. See WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, 7B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d § 1805 (2001). 
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